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THE NEW MACROPRUDENTIAL REFORM
PARADIGM: CAN IT WORK?
Miriam F. Weismann,* Jason H. Peterson,** Christopher
A. Buscaglia***
“Macroprudential policies focus on risks to the financial system as a
whole. Such risks may be crosscutting, affecting a number of firms and
markets, or they may be concentrated in a few key areas. A
macroprudential approach would complement and build on the current
regulatory and supervisory structure, in which the primary focus is the
safety and soundness of individual institutions and markets.” 1
This article addresses whether the implementation of new
macroprudential reform policy can work to control systemic risk across the
capital and financial markets given the current regulatory infrastructure in
the U.S. The passage of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (Reform Act) signaled a major change in the current regulatory and
supervisory infrastructure from a microprudential model to a “big picture”
or macroprudential approach to systemic risk in two significant ways.
First, while addressing systemic risk has historically been within the realm
of financial or prudential regulation, the new paradigm of macroprudential
policy expands prudential regulation into the securities markets as a new
stop gap measure to control “crosscutting” systemic risk. Second, the
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1. Benjamin Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Res. Bank, Financial Reform to Address
Systemic Risk, Address to the Council on Foreign Relations, (March 10, 2009) (emphasis
added),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernake/20090310a.htm
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090310a.htm.
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Reform Act also creates a hybrid reform model designed to wed the new
macroprudential systemic risk management policy, under the oversight of a
super regulator, with the current supervisory “functional oversight” model
implemented by existing federal agencies. The article focuses on whether
the hybrid reform model will work given the limitations and weaknesses of
the current regulatory infrastructure upon which it is built. To address this
question, the article examines four federal agencies responsible for
supervising some material aspect of financial transactions in the securities
and banking sectors. Understanding the U.S model offers a ground for
comparison with similar macroprudential policies recently implemented in
other global financial markets.
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INTRODUCTION
The Glass–Steagall Act of 1933 2 provided for the separation of
commercial and investment banking as part of the 1933 Banking Act. 3 The
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, also known as the Financial Modernization
Services Act of 1999, 4 repealed part of Glass-Steagall, removing barriers in
the market among banking companies, securities companies, and insurance
companies that prohibited any one institution from acting as any
combination of an investment bank, a commercial bank, and an insurance
company. 5 The change was viewed as a welcome deregulation of the
banking and financial services market. The theory was that the market is
the best possible facilitator of economic coordination and rationality, even
superior to central planning and regulation. Deregulation became the
mantra of global capital markets in the race to become more competitive in
global financial centers. 6
2. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
3. The Glass-Steagall Act technically refers to two separate federal laws: the GlassSteagall Act of 1932 and the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, the latter known as the Banking
Act of 1933. See J. Gorman, General Counsel, Conference of State Bank Examiners,
Summary
of
Provisions,
(2012),
available
at
http://www.csbs.org/bankinglaw101/BL101%20PDF/Glass-Steagall_Act.pdf.
(describing
how the Act “effectively separated commercial banking from investment banking”); The
1933 Act “also amended the Federal Reserve Act to institute the system of federal deposit
insurance on a temporary basis, and created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”).” Id.
4. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub.
L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801 et seq.).
5. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Summary of Provisions,
http://www.banking.senate.gov/conf/grmleach.htm.
6. See generally PETER KOSLOWSKI, THE ETHICS OF BANKING: CONCLUSIONS FROM
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 167-76 (Springer ed., 2010).
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The dominance of deregulation greatly facilitated the recent financial
crisis and the trillion dollar bailouts of the banking and financial services
system. 7 The resulting destruction of capital through big bank deregulation
has had enormous political, economic, and social consequences. The
singular consequence examined in this article focuses on the change in the
regulatory and supervisory model aimed at the banking and securities
markets in an effort to ease systemic risk and prevent future melt downs. 8
Specifically, the article examines the movement from microprudential
regulation to macroprudential regulation, 9 not only in the banking and
financial services market but also in the extension of the model to the
securities market in an effort to address the threat of “crosscutting”
systemic risk.
This idea of integrating prudential or financial risk regulation into the
securities laws is relatively new and mostly untested. 10 Securities
regulation has traditionally focused on securing market efficiency and
preserving the trust and confidence of investors in the marketplace,
whereas regulatory monitoring of prudential systemic risk has been
confined to financial sector regulators and done at a microprudential
level. 11
The specific question to be addressed is whether the new model of
macroprudential regulation, envisioned by the Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Reform Act), 12 can successfully interface with
the actual regulatory apparatus in place. The answer to the question lies to
a great degree in understanding how the U.S. regulatory system works.
The issue here is not one of design, but rather the probable success of
agency implementation.
Systemic risk has been defined as, “the potential for the financial

7. Id. at 167.
8. “The idea that macroprudential policy is needed to correct market failures, rather
than to smooth financial cycles is important. . . . The identification and correction of market
failures is a clearer, uncontroversial objective for a macroprudential regulator.” Giovanni
Favara & Lev Ratnovski, Macroprudential Policy: Economic Rationale and Optimal Tools,
VOX (Aug. 6, 2012),
http://www.voxeu.org/article/macroprudential-policy-economic-rationale-and-optimal-tools.
9. See Claudio Borio, Towards a Macroprudential Framework for Financial
Supervision and Regulation, 49 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 181 (2003) (providing in-depth
finance discussion regarding the distinction between microprudential and macroprudential
models of regulation).
10. See Anita I. Anand, Is Systemic Risk Relevant to Securities Regulation?, 60 U.
TORONTO L.J. 941, 942 (2010) [hereinafter Anand] (stating that very few countries have
integrated systemic risk into their securities laws).
11. Id. at 943.
12. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Reform Act].
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distress of a particular firm or group of firms to trigger broad spillover
effects in financial markets, further triggering wrenching dislocations that
affect broad economic performance.” 13
By analogy, systemic risk can be thought of as an illness that becomes
uncontrollably contagious. 14 “Crosscutting” systemic risk can be described
as a risk of default by one market participant that will have repercussions
on other market participants in different markets due to the interlocking
nature of financial markets both domestically and globally. 15
The passage of the Reform Act, aimed at addressing systemic risk,
signaled a major change in the current regulatory and supervisory
infrastructure from a microprudential model to a “big picture” or
First, while
macroprudential approach in two significant ways. 16
addressing systemic risk has historically been within the realm of financial
or prudential regulation, the new paradigm of macroprudential policy
expands prudential regulation into the securities markets as a new stop gap
measure to control “crosscutting” systemic risk. 17 Second, the Reform Act
also creates a hybrid reform model designed to wed the new
macroprudential systemic risk management policy, under the oversight of a
super regulator, with the current supervisory “functional oversight” model
implemented by existing federal agencies. 18 Chairman Bernanke recently
observed, regarding the relative benefits of this hybrid model, that “[b]oth
regulation and market discipline have important roles to play in
constraining risk-taking in financial markets; the best outcomes are

13. Emil Henry, Assistant Secretary for Treasury for Financial Services, U.S. Treasury,
Address Before the House Policy Council of the Financial Services Roundtable (June 26,
2006), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js4338.aspx.
14. Id.
15. CHRISTOPHER LAURSEN ET AL., , PCI WHITE PAPER, WHY TOO BIG TO FAIL IS TOO
SHORT SIGHTED TO SUCCEED: PROBLEMS WITH RELIANCE ON FIRM SIZE FOR SYSTEMIC RISK
DETERMINATION,
(2010),
http://www.pciaa.net/web/sitehome.nsf/lcpublic/379/$file/pci_whitepaper_toobigtofail.pdf
16. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Res. Bank, Address Before 47th Annual
Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Chicago, Ill. Conference on Bank Structure
and Competition (May 5, 2011) [hereinafter Bernanke] (highlighting the changes and goals
of the Reform Act).
17. See Letter from Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Res. Bank, to Bob Corker, U.S.
Senator (Oct. 30, 2009) (discussing the new paradigm for addressing systemic risk); See
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Res. Bank, Address Before 2012 Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta Financial Markets Conference, Stone Mountain Georgia (April 9, 2012) (explaining
the government’s overhaul of the financial system and how it takes systemic risk into
account).
18. Annette Nazareth, New Paradigms for Financial Regulation in the United States
and the European Union, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 845, 847 (2010) [hereinafter Nazareth].
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achieved when these two forms of oversight work effectively together.” 19

I. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN FINANCE THEORY AND LEGAL
REGULATION
The Reform Act effectively integrates finance theory and the law but
not much is written about that process. The connection between
macroprudential policy and regulatory implementation is clear given that
the failure of credible regulatory oversight in the regulatory and
supervisory infrastructure is recognized as one major contributing factor to
the rise of systemic risk. 20 Thus, it is difficult to understand the new vision
of regulatory reform in the marketplace brought about by the Reform Act
without first understanding the underlying finance and economic theories
that explain the new direction of the law. 21 However, current literature fails
to address the important question of whether new financial reform is indeed
in lockstep with the existing regulatory infrastructure needed to implement
its goal of stabilizing the market economy. Arguably, the success of
financial reform depends in great measure upon the actual legal authority of
regulators to implement real economic reforms. The analysis of the four
federal agencies below illustrates that it is a mistake to assume that such
broad legal authority resides with the regulators.
A. Implementation of the Financial Model
An economic study by Hanson, Kashyap & Stein, focusing on the
model of macroprudential regulation, addresses the financial crisis in
private sector banking institutions and how the movement from
microprudential regulation to a new regulatory paradigm of
macroprudential regulation could better control systemic risk. 22 In

19. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Res. Bank, Remarks at the Squam Lake
Conference, Remarks on “ The Squam Lake Report: Fixing the F inancial S ystem” (June
16,
2010),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100616a.htm.
20. David Lieberg & Michaela Posch, Macroprudential Regulation and Supervision:
From the Identification of Systemic Risk to Policy Measures, FIN. STABILITY REP., June
2011, at 68, http://www.oenb.at/en/img/fsr_21_special_topic_02_tcm16-235512.pdf
[hereinafter Lieberg & Posch].
21. See generally Bernanke, supra note 16 (discussing the goals and reasoning behind
reform regulation).
22. Samuel G. Hanson, Annil K. Kashyap, & Jeremy C. Stein, A Macroprudential
Approach to Financial Regulation, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2011), available at
http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.25.1.3 [hereinafter Hanson et al.].
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expanding the “field of vision” from safety- and-soundness regulations that
focus on individual financial institutions in isolation to the financial market
as a whole, Hanson, Kashyap and Stein argue that specific changes to
monetary policy and capital requirements can ease systemic risk. 23 At the
conclusion of the article, the authors pose a critical but unanswered
question “about how such regulation might be implemented.” 24 Noting that
macroprudential oversight has been delegated to large councils populated
by the heads of many diverse regulatory agencies such as the Financial
Stability Oversight Committee (FSOC), a creature of the new Reform Act,
and the European Systemic Risk Board, the article asks whether the
existing weaknesses in the regulatory system itself can be addressed
“sensibly.” 25 The concern is not isolated. For example, Davis and Karim
worry that new regulation does not merely lead to substitution capital flows
toward the remaining unregulated or less regulated sectors. 26 Milne
cautions that it is necessary to grasp not only the new contours of
macroprudential policy (envisioned by the UK Financial Services
Authority), but also how those new policies will be implemented to achieve
the intended reform objectives. 27
Thus, the Hanson, Kashyap & Stein article leaves open two important
albeit unanswered questions. 28 First, is macroprudential regulation merely
a function of shifting the focus from a particular banking institution in
isolation to the financial market as a whole, or is the new model of
macroprudential regulation, as envisioned by the Reform Act, a regulatory
model that expands the field of vision to include both the financial and
capital markets? In short, what are the parameters of macroprudential
reforms? The second unanswered question is whether a macroprudential
reform model can be successfully implemented in the U.S. based upon
limitations in the current regulatory infrastructure?
B. Credible Regulatory Oversight
The second unanswered question was partially addressed in
Weismann’s article, which specifically focuses on how to achieve credible
regulatory oversight, given the current U.S. regulatory apparatus that

23. Id. at 4.
24. Id. at 23.
25. Id.
26. Phillip Davis, & Diruba Karim, Macroprudential Regulation - The Missing Policy
Pillar, 211 NAT’L INST. ECON. REV., 11 (2010), http://ner.sagepub.com/content/211/1/67.
27. Alstair Milne, Macroprudential Policy: What Can It Achieve?, 25 OXFORD REV. OF
ECON. POL’Y 608, 611 (2009) [hereinafter Milne].
28. See Hanson et al., supra note 22 (discussing macroprudential regulation).
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provides meaningful control of a nation’s financial infrastructure and at the
same time preserves innovation and growth in the marketplace. 29
Weismann observes that the oversight question is generally framed in terms
of identifying a corporate or market disaster and then reflecting upon what
factors are needed to make oversight work. 30 However, this framing
usually is “without any real understanding of the boundaries of regulatory
authority and the systemic problems impacting the probable success of
oversight.” 31 While a valuable exercise in scholarship, its shortcoming is
comparable to trying to fix a watch without first understanding all of the
moving parts. 32 The article then examines several questions in the context
of the current regulatory structure, including: What is regulatory oversight?
How does regulation work? What is the actual legal jurisdiction of the
regulatory agencies in the financial sector? What is the standard for
determining whether the oversight exercised by a particular federal agency
is “credible”? Who makes the decisions in government, if anyone? Given
the current slow pace of passing enabling regulations, does the new Reform
Act signal real change in financial oversight? 33
C. Integrating Theory and Practice to Achieve Reform
To determine whether the new macroprudential reform model can be
successfully implemented in the U.S. given its current domestic regulatory
infrastructure, four federal agencies, responsible for supervising material
aspects of financial transactions in the securities and banking sectors, are
considered, including: the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC); Federal Reserve Board

29. See Miriam F. Weismann, Achieving the goal of ‘credible’ regulatory oversight, 15
J. LEGAL ETHICAL AND REGUL. ISSUES 1, 1 (2012) [hereinafter Weismann] (focusing on “the
difficult and unresolved question of how to achieve credible regulatory oversight that
provides meaningful control of the nations’ financial infrastructure and at the same time
preserves innovation and growth in the marketplace”).
30. Id. at 3.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Weismann concludes: “In short, it is fair to conclude that law makers,
regulators and the private sector, ostensibly in partnership with the regulators, must all
accept responsibility for the current state of the financial markets. However, this should not
become just an exercise in assessing blame. Instead, the goal should be to focus on
accountability for the failure of the regulatory system to identify systemic risk. The
Reform Act, like SOX before it, is reactive legislation enacted not only to solve this
nagging problem of achieving financial stability in the marketplace but also to send a
remedial message in the hope of coaxing ‘gun-shy’ investors back into the markets.” Id. at
45. The article then suggests several regulatory drafting “best practices” to increase the
level of credible oversight. Id. at 42.
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(FRB); and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The
important changes made by the Reform Act, including the creation of the
umbrella regulator the FSOC 34 to implement the new macroprudential
policy, is likewise considered in this context.
The regulatory analysis first considers whether a particular agency has
operated in compliance with its congressional mandate in accordance with
the agency’s regulatory model. Several conclusions about oversight are
provided based upon the relative success or failure of a particular agency’s
oversight activities. Then, changes to the respective agency’s authority and
jurisdiction implemented by the Reform Act are also reviewed. Finally, the
article concludes that achieving the goal of credible oversight and reform
through the implementation of macroprudential policy reform is
complicated and cannot be cured simply by piling on more rules and
regulations. Even achieving a baseline of credible supervision under
macroprudential reforms may not necessarily result in credible oversight.
Inadequate regulatory oversight embraces a multitude of external
deficiencies, including a lack of resources, an agency’s lack of focus,
pressure from outside political forces, legal and policy limitations on
agency authority, regulatory gaps created by policy decisions, and
concealment of dishonest business practices in the private sector. These
externalities directly impact the probable success of implementing the
macroprudential model of systemic risk management embedded in the
Reform Act in the domestic and global venues currently considering the
problem.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATORY
MODEL: A HYBRID BY DESIGN
A. Macroprudential Regulation: A Hybrid Model
The new model of regulatory policy and oversight envisioned by the
Reform Act is a hybrid between the existing regulatory structure, referred
to as “functional regulation,” and macroprudential systemic risk
management, addressing both crosscutting risks and risks that flow across

34. See generally, EDWARD V. MURPHY AND MICHAEL B. BERNIER, CRS REPORT TO
CONGRESS, FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL: A FRAMEWORK TO MITIGATE
SYSTEMIC
RISK,
R42083
(2011),
available
at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R42083_20111115.pdf (describing the purpose and scope of
the FSOC). The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) was created by the Reform
Act as part of a comprehensive reform of the banking and securities market regulators. Id.
The FSOC both monitors systemic risk in the financial system and coordinates several
federal financial regulators. Id.
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multiple markets. 35 Financial experts tend to agree that systemic risk
regulation and functional regulation “are closely interconnected and highly
complementary.” 36 Separation of systemic risk regulation and functional
regulation creates a risk that nether performs satisfactorily in isolation. 37
There are, however, several variants of the macroprudential risk
management model. Indeed, a clear consensus on the definition,
parameters and focus of macroprudential regulation has yet to be reached. 38
Generally, macroprudential policy has been defined as the “use of
regulatory and other instruments to reduce the risk of financial
instability.” 39 In the case of the Reform Act, the new paradigm of systemic
risk regulation is broadly designed, blurring the traditional distinction
between financial and securities markets regulation and joins the two in a
more unified system of supervision. 40 Instead of focusing on components
of the financial system, macroprudential policy addresses the system as a
whole and, in conjunction with microprudential regulation and supervision,
is gauged to achieve financial stability. 41
One main feature of macroprudential regulation in the global financial
services industry has been an effort to control the social costs associated
with economic downturns and excessive balance sheet shrinkage on the
part of multiple financial institutions facing a common shock. 42 Federal
35. Nazareth, supra note 18, at 847; Weismann, supra note 29, at 8.
36. Nazareth, supra note 18, at 847.
37. See generally Bruce Arnold et al., Systemic Risk, Macroprudential Policy
Frameworks, Monitoring Systems and the Evolution of Capital Adequacy, 36 J. BANK. &
FIN. 3125, 3125-32 (2012)(discussing systemic risk’s advancement, measurement and
implementation difficulties as a result of policy reform).
38. Id. at 3126; Lieberg & Posch, supra note 20, at 68.
39. Milne, supra note 27, at 611.
40. Bernanke, supra note 16.
41. Id.
42. See generally, BANK OF ENGLAND, THE ROLE OF MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY (2009),
available
at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/financialstability/roleofmac
roprudentialpolicy091121.pdf (“Whatever its structure, the prudential regulatory framework
will need to be re-oriented to have a system-wide focus. And improvements need to be
made to allow financial institutions to fail without imposing unacceptable costs on the rest
of society.”); Stephen Cecchetti, Econ. Adviser and Head of Monetary and Econ. Dep’t,
Bank for Int’l Settlements (BIS), Remarks Prepared for the Second Conference of the
European System of Central Banks: The Future of Financial Intermediation and Regulation,
(Oct. 30, 2012), available at http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp121030.pdf (“As recent events
have shown yet again, the fundamental links between the real economy and the financial
system make it difficult if not impossible, to isolate the former from shocks originating in
the latter . . . the reason to proscribe certain activities, to constrain certain actions, and to
require certain behaviors is to not to protect individuals from facing the consequences of
their own actions. Rather, it is to keep the negligence, miscalculations, and errors of one
individual or institution from affecting the system as a whole”).
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Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, recognizing that such adverse shocks
and systemic risk may be crosscutting, namely, risk affecting a number of
firms and markets, concluded that macroprudential regulatory reforms
should extend beyond the financial markets into the securities markets as
well. 43 The crosscutting effect is likewise a global concern. 44 As noted
previously, securities regulation has traditionally focused on securing
market efficiency and preserving the trust and confidence of investors. On
the other hand, regulatory monitoring of prudential systemic risk has been
confined to financial sector regulators and done at a microprudential level.
This notable separation between microprudential regulatory goals for the
financial and securities markets is also common in other developed
economies in the world. 45 It is the movement from microprudential
regulation to macroprudential regulation 46 and its integration with the
current U.S. regulatory system of functional regulation that has created
complexity and challenges in implementing the Reform Act.
B. Functional Regulation
The oversight model of “functional regulation” remains relatively
unchanged by the Reform Act. 47 This regulatory system embraces both the
banking sector and the securities and futures sector and assigns supervisory

43. Bernanke, supra note 16.
44. See generally, Oliver DeBandt & Philipp Hartmann, Systemic Risk: A Survey
(European Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 35, 2009) (exploring systemic risk as the basis in
economic crises), available at http://www.pedz.uni-mannheim.de/daten/edz-ki/ezb/00/wpaper/ecbwp035.pdf.
45. Anand, supra note 10.
46. See generally, Erlend Nier, Macroprudential Policy-Taxonomy and Challenges,
216 NAT’L ECON. REV. R1, R1 (2011) [hereinafter Nier] (exploring questions and strategies
to effectively implement macroprudential regulation)..
47. Weismann, supra note 29, at 8. (“The current regulatory oversight model in the
securities and futures financial marketplace can best be described as a hybrid of government
and private sector governance. Federal agencies, authorized to regulate within legal
boundaries set by Congress, are bound in a governance partnership with private sector
organizations including SROs (self-regulatory organizations), which ostensibly operate in
lockstep with government regulation. Congress crafted this hybrid model of financial
oversight with the passage of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act. The original SEA
regulatory model was aptly described by former SEC Chair Arthur Leavitt: ‘ Our securities
markets operate under a ‘self-regulatory’ system. Markets serve an important public
interest, and deserve public oversight; but markets are also innovative and fast moving,
and easily stifled by the heavy hand of government. So Congress arrived at a
formula in which the industry polices itself, with SEC oversight. This keeps us out of most
day- to-day affairs, and allows us to keep our hands off, but our eyes open. And
on those rare occasions when self-regulation goes off track, the SEC must act in the
public interest’”)..

WEISMANN, PETERSON, AND BUSCAGLIA_FINAL (ARTICLE 2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1040

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

8/28/2014 2:31 PM

[Vol. 16.4

authority based upon “functional” operations. 48 Thus, financial products or
activities are regulated and supervised according to their function, no
matter which market or firm offers the product or participates in the
activity. 49 This also means that more than one federal agency may be
responsible for supervision at the same time. 50 Broker-dealer activities, for
instance, are generally subject to the SEC’s jurisdiction, whether the
broker-dealer is a subsidiary of a bank holding company subject to Federal
Reserve supervision or a subsidiary of an investment bank. 51 According to
the Government Accounting Office (GAO), “[t]he functional regulator
approach is intended to provide consistency in regulation, focus regulatory
restrictions on the relevant functions area, and avoid the potential need for
regulatory agencies to develop expertise in all aspects of financial
regulation.” 52
The relative benefits of the functionality model are two-fold. First,
specialization by regulators allows them to better understand the risks
associated with particular activities or products. Second, competition
among regulators helps promote regulatory innovation, providing
businesses with a method to move to regulators whose approaches better
match the businesses’ operations. 53 However, the Federal Reserve has
admitted that although the model is effective in design, it is ineffective in
its “execution.” 54 This inefficiency has resulted in an “institution-byinstitution supervisory approach,” which fails to identify overall systemic
instability. 55 The solution to this problem is somewhat addressed by the
Reform Act through the FSOC and its new role in bringing together the
functional regulators to supervise big picture systemic risk posed by Wall
Street and the banking industry. 56 The functionality characteristic of the
oversight model, however, remains in place and is not changed by the
Reform Act. 57

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, GAO-08-32, INDUSTRY TRENDS
CONTINUE TO CHALLENGE THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2007), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/270/267957.pdf.
53. Id.
54. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Res. Bank, Fostering Financial Stability, Address
Before 2012 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Financial Markets Conference, Stone
Mountain Georgia (April 9, 2012).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Weismann, supra note 29, at 9.
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C. The Financial Services Oversight Council (FSOC)
Notably, the Reform Act does not change this model of empowering
and limiting agency regulatory authority despite the creation of the new
systemic risk overseer, the FSOC. 58 The FSOC consists of ten voting
members including, nine federal financial regulatory agencies and an
independent member with insurance expertise and five nonvoting
members. 59
In enacting the Reform Act, Congress responded to various criticisms
of the functional regulatory model. 60 Congress recognized that the then
existing regulatory structure focused regulators narrowly on individual
institutions and markets, which allowed supervisory gaps to grow and
regulatory inconsistencies to emerge, which in turn, permitted arbitrage and
weakened standards. 61 No single entity held responsibility for monitoring
and addressing risks to financial stability posed by different types of
financial firms operating in and across multiple markets. 62 As a result,
important parts of the system were left unregulated. 63 The federal
regulatory agencies’ analyses selected in this article will aptly illustrate this
point. The Reform Act is an attempt to fix the flaws, not eliminate the

58. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1001, 4
Stat. 1376 (2010), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-4173.
59. Id. at § 111(b)(1)(A-j). The voting federal regulatory agencies include: the
Secretary of the Treasury, who serves as the Chairperson of the FSOC, the Chairman
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Director of the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Chairperson of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Chairperson of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the Chairman
of the National Credit Union Administration Board (NCUA), and an independent member
with insurance expertise that is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate
for a six-year term. H.R. 4173,111th Cong. § 111(2010). The FHFA was added by the
Reform Act to replace the now dissolved OTS. Nonvoting regulatory members are selected
from various state agencies and serve only in an advisory capacity. The state nonvoting
members have two-year terms. Id. at § 111(b)(2).
60. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-1049T, FINANCIAL
REGULATION: RECENT CRISIS REAFFIRMS THE NEED TO OVERHAUL THE U.S. REGULATORY
SYSTEM 2 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d091049t.pdf. (“The current
U.S. financial regulatory system is fragmented due to complex arrangements of federal and
state regulation put into place over the past 150 years . . . . Today, almost a dozen federal
regulatory agencies, numerous self-regulatory organizations, and hundreds of state financial
regulatory agencies share responsibility for overseeing the financial services industry”).
61. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, TREAS., BUDGET OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL
YEAR 2014 (2002), at FSOC-3, available at http://www.treasury.gov/about/budgetperformance/CJ14/14.%20FSOC%20CJ%20Final%20ok.pdf.
62. Bernanke, supra note 16.
63. Id.
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model, and to provide business with a “strong incentive to avoid becoming
systemically significant” or “too big to fail.” 64
As Chairman Ben Bernanke explained, the purpose of the FSOC is to
provide a forum for agencies with differing responsibilities and
perspectives to share information and approaches and facilitate
identification and mitigation of emerging threats to financial stability. 65 It
is intended “that the lines of accountability for systemic oversight be
clearly drawn, [but that] the council should not be directly involved in rulewriting and supervision. 66 Rather, those functions should remain with the
relevant supervisors, with the council in a coordinating role.” 67 Thus, the
FSOC can be characterized as more of a “looker” rather than a “doer” with
a significant exception where the marketplace is “imperiled,” a situation
still to be defined by implementing regulations. 68
The creation of the FSOC also responds to the risk that the
information relied on by a systemic risk regulator, and supplied by a
functional regulator, is merely derivative in nature and may lag behind real
time events due to coordination efforts. 69 This issue is problematic in times
of crisis as evidenced by the recent subprime mortgage debacle. In this
situation, a council of regulators, such as the FSOC, is conducive to
information aggregation. 70 To identify emerging stress and imbalances and
then address them through timely and efficient regulatory calibration, the
systemic regulator must have close connections to the functional regulator
and regular and close contacts with multiple market representatives and
intermediaries. 71 To achieve calibrated regulation, the macroprudential
model is designed to ensure that all systemically important markets are
subject to consolidated supervision. 72
This complex task requires
coordination, timely information sharing, and policy coordination at both
the domestic and international levels. 73
64. David Moss, An Ounce of Prevention, HARVARD MAG., Sept.-Oct. 2009, at 5,
available at
http://harvardmagazine.com/2009/09/financial-risk-management-plan.
65. Bernanke, supra note 16.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Weismann, supra note 29, at 13.
69. Nazareth, supra note 18, at 847.
70. Bernanke, supra note 16.
71. PAUL VOLCKER, THE GROUP OF THIRTY THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION
APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE: APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES
GLOBAL
MARKETPLACE,
14
(2008),
available
at
IN
A
http://www.group30.org/images/PDF/The%20Structure%20of%20Financial%20Supervision
.pdf.
72. Bernanke, supra note16.
73. Id.
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III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFORM MODEL THROUGH THE
REGULATORY INFRASTRUCTURE
Can the hybrid macroprudential reform model work effectively and
efficiently within the boundaries and limitations of the current U.S. federal
regulatory system? Erlend Nier, Senior Financial Sector Expert at the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), postulates that, critical to the success
of the implementation of any macroprudential oversight model, are four
key factors: information collection powers, designation powers, rulemaking
and calibration powers, and a strong mandate. 74 Information collection
starts with an assessment of systemic risk for the financial sector as an
integrative whole. 75 The macroprudential authority should have designation
powers or the authority to create policy for all systemic institutions. 76
Rule-making should be calibrated across time and industry sectors. 77
Finally, a strong mandate should constrain the discretionary use of powers
and, through legal regulation, define the primary objectives of the
macroprudential authority. 78
Nier’s ideal model of the system of macroprudential oversight does
not completely coalesce with the existing U.S. regulatory model. As noted
above, the FSOC is more of a “looker” rather than a “doer” with the critical
aspects of credible regulatory oversight remaining within each federal
agency whose powers are strictly mandated by Congress. However, Nier’s
framework, along with an understanding of how the current U.S. regulatory
infrastructure operates, does provide a starting point to evaluate whether
the U.S. regulatory system and the Reform Act’s macroprudential model
can successfully interface to achieve real economic and market reforms.
A. The U.S. System of Regulatory Oversight
Credible regulatory oversight is a central component in achieving the
goal of good corporate governance. In the Enron hearings, Congress
credited the absence of credible oversight as one of the principle causes of
the corporate debacle. 79 It concluded that both the regulators and the
74. Nier, supra note 46, at R3.
75. Id. at R6.
76. Id. at R7.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOV. AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT
OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, S. Prt. 107-75, at 2 (2002),
available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-107SPRT82147/pdf/CPRT-107SPRT82147.pdf. (“In
looking at the array of purported checks on financial misbehavior, what Committee staff
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traditional “corporate watchdogs” in the private sector “failed to bark.”
More recently, the FCIC Report of investigation of the current financial
crisis echoes the same sentiment, noting that the regulators were simply not
“at their posts.” 80
Credible oversight is also important in its breach. Particularly where
markets lack transparency or are otherwise unregulated, as with derivatives
and hedge funds, such unregulated, unsupervised financial markets can all
too easily suffer catastrophic failure. If a market center gains a reputation
as having lax oversight and surveillance, that market will suffer the
consequences. Those consequences include “the harsh reality that where
there is no market, there is no value.” 81 The recent collapse of capital
markets resulting from inadequate or absent credible oversight underscores
the true importance of the discussion.
In simple terms, credible regulatory oversight is, at a minimum, a
function determining whether the agency is doing the job that it is charged
by law to do. Simply put, credible regulatory oversight is at least a function
of whether the agency is doing the job that it is authorized by law to do. 82
In 1993, Congress passed the Government Performance and Results Act
(GPRA) to “improve the confidence of the American people in the
capability of the Federal Government, by systematically holding federal
agencies accountable for achieving program results.” 83 The Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) is responsible for the implementation of
the GPRA. 84 The OMB typically examines the overall effectiveness of the
entire federal apparatus and/or its various parts. 85
Additionally, the Inspector General Act of 1978 was enacted to
discovered was deeply disturbing not so much because they uncovered malfeasance or
intentional wrongdoing on anyone’s part (although that seems to have been present in some
cases as well), but because what emerged was a story of systemic and arguably catastrophic
failure, a failure of all the watchdogs to properly discharge their appointed roles. Despite the
magnitude of Enron’s implosion and the apparent pervasiveness of its fraudulent conduct,
virtually no one in the multilayered system of controls devised to protect the public detected
Enron’s problems, or, if they did, they did nothing to correct them or alert investors. Not one
of the watchdogs was there to prevent or warn of the impending disaster . . . .” ).
80. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, xviii (2011),
available
at
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcicreports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf.
81. William Bodine & Christopher Nagel, Quants Gone Wild - the Subprime Crisis,
WALL ST. J., March 2008, available at http://247wallst.com/2008/03/27/quants-gone-wil/
[hereinafter Bodine].
82. Weismann, supra note 29, at 5.
83. Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62 §2(b)(1)
(1993).
84. Id. at § 3(a).
85. Id. at § 3.
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conduct and supervise audits and investigations relating to the programs
and operations of numerous federal agencies. 86 Functionally, the IG focuses
on the operations of a specific agency, 87 whereas the OMB examines the
overall effectiveness of the regulatory apparatus, or some part thereof, in
connection with a particular systemic issue or problem. 88 The Reform Act
also creates the Council of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight
(CIGFO), which consists of all of the IGs assigned to audit the performance
of the federal regulators serving on the FSOC. 89 The regulators are now
ostensibly more highly regulated.
Ideally, when the audit results reveal that the agency has satisfied its
congressional mandate, it acts credibly. When the agency does not, it fails.
The problem is that averting crisis through adequate supervision is often
difficult to document. When something does not go wrong, it is hard to
prove that the system is functioning because the regulators are supposedly
fulfilling their respective jobs.
B. Externalities Impacting Credible Regulatory Oversight
Oversight may also be credible in the sense that it satisfies its
congressional mandate; however, oversight may still be unable to prevent
corporate misconduct where the circumstances are beyond the regulator’s

86. Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95−452, 92 Stat. 1101, H.R. 8588
(1978). .
87. Id. §§4(a)(4); 6(a)(2); 6(c); See also Robert Longley, About the Office of the
Inspector
General,
http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/thepresidentandcabinet/a/oig.htm.
(“Within the federal agencies are politically independent individuals called Inspectors
General who are responsible for ensuring that the agencies operate efficiently, effectively
and legally”).
88. The Mission and Structure of the Office of Management and Budget,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/organization_mission.
(“The management side of OMB is comprised of five offices, four of which are statutory,
that oversee and coordinate the Administration’s procurement, financial management, egovernment, performance and personnel management, and information and regulatory
policies. In each of these areas, OMB’s role includes not only administrative management
functions, but also program and policy management (e.g., program delivery and outcomes).
This role encompasses oversight of how agencies devise, implement, manage, and evaluate
the statutory programs and policies for which they are responsible. This responsibility is
central to OMB’s efforts to assist in agency strategic planning, goal-setting, performance
measurement, information management, evaluation, and policy research. These functions
are essential parts of the policy and program direction advice that OMB provides.” ).
89. See generally COUNCIL OF INSPECTORS GEN. ON FIN. OVERSIGHT, ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE COUNCIL OF INSPECTORS GENERAL ON FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT, (2011),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/oig/files/CIGFO_Annual_Report_July_2011.pdf.
(explaining the creation and composition of the Council of Inspectors General on Financial
Oversight).
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sphere of control. In short, credible supervision may not necessarily result
in credible oversight where outside forces prevent or interfere with the
regulatory oversight function.
First, even assuming that the regulatory agency is functioning
according to its legal mandate, the congressionally authorized degree of
supervision may be inadequate to detect and prevent corporate and
financial misconduct. 90 Thus, the agency may be doing precisely what it is
authorized to do but lacks congressional authority to prevent the problem. 91
Case in point: the CFTC, through its former chair Brooksley Born,
requested and was refused the congressional authority to regulate
derivatives. 92
Even more problematic are those policy decisions made outside of the
control of a particular regulatory agency that may impact the agency’s
ability to control the consequences in the marketplace. 93 Indeed, John
Taylor of Stanford University makes a compelling argument that
government intervention and conscious economic policy decisions
designed to protect consumers actually created, worsened, and prolonged
the current financial crisis. 94 Also, not to be forgotten is the wave of
deregulation during the Reagan era, referred to as “the cure that killed” and
crippled regulatory oversight. 95
Next, market innovations may simply outpace regulatory control. 96
90. Brooksley Born, Chairperson, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n,
Regulatory Responses to the Risks in the OTC Derivatives Market, Address to ABA Section
of Business Law (Nov. 13, 1998), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches/opaborn-40.htm. (“Notably, no reporting requirements
are imposed on most OTC derivatives market participants. This lack of basic information
about the positions held by OTC derivatives users and about the nature and extent of their
exposures potentially allows them to take positions that may threaten our regulated markets
or, indeed, our economy without the knowledge of any federal regulatory authority.”)
[hereinafter Born].
91. Id.
92. Id.; See also DVD: Frontline: The Warning (PBS 2009), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/warning/view/ (describing the requests of
Chairperson Brooksley Born) [hereinafter Frontline].
93. See generally, JOHN TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK: HOW GOVERNMENT ACTIONS
AND INTERVENTIONS CAUSED, PROLONGED AND WORSENED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (Hoover
Inst. Press 2009) (describing the problem of policy decisions made without control of
particular agencies).
94. Id.
95. See generally, KITTY CALAVITA & HENRY N. PONTELL, Heads I Win, Tails You
Lose: Deregulation, Crime And Crisis In The Savings and Loan Industry, in CRIMES OF
PRIVILEGE (Shover & Wright eds., Oxford University Press 2001) (describing deregulation
during the Reagan era).
96. See Henry Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure
and The Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457 (1993) [hereinafter
Hu] (describing market innovations); The Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the
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Henry Hu demonstrated in his landmark article in 1993 that the very design
of a financial product has the ability to impede regulatory oversight and
control. 97 Hu’s point is aptly illustrated by Thomas Donaldson’s example
of unregulated hedge funds, which he argues are, by design, made up of
“intractable conflicts that cannot be resolved through government
regulation.” 98
Additionally, concealed fraudulent behavior may impede oversight.99
For example, the fraudulent use of earnings by management is typically
invisible to the naked regulatory eye even upon audit of the books and
records. 100 The resulting collapse of trust, described by Greenspan as the
cornerstone of the marketplace, some argue, cannot be repaired by
regulation at all. 101 Indeed, certain financial behaviors are just “bad to the
bone” and cannot be fixed until some form of internal corporate
governance addresses the inherent conflicts of interest inbred in corporate
culture. 102 Thus, the problem may not be one of failed credible regulatory
oversight but instead, one caused by other outside forces, externalities, that
can overtake the oversight function and control the outcome.
Inevitably, the responsibility for oversight failure must be shared with
the private sector, which has strenuously insisted on preserving a selfregulatory model. As part of that self-regulatory model, the private sector
has certain delineated oversight duties to the public, such as those
performed by self-regulatory organizations (SROs). 103 At its most basic
level, self-regulation is the manner by which all firms self-police their own

Regulation of OTC Derivatives: OTC Derivatives: Modernizing Oversight to Increase
Transparency and Reduce Risks: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Banking Com.: Subcomm.
on Securities, Insurance, and Investment, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Henry T. C.
Hu), available at
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=a8
9592d9-cbaa-4930-8ce4-de1291688474.
97. Hu, supra note 96.
98. See generally Thomas Donaldson, Hedge Fund Ethics, 18 J. Bus. Ethics 405 (2008)
[hereinafter Donaldson] (exampling the inability of government to resolve the conflicts of
unregulated hedge funds).
99. See MIRIAM WEISMANN, CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL FRAUD, THE LEGAL
AND FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF CORPORATE MISCONDUCT (American Bar Association
Press, Chicago 2012) [hereinafter CORPORATE CRIME].
100. Id.
101. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Res. Bank, Address to the Conference on Bank
Structure and Competition, Chicago, Illinois (May 8, 2003), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2003/20030508/.
102. Donaldson, supra note 98, at 415.
103. See BrokerCheck Glossary, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH. (June 28, 2010),
http://www.finra.org/Investors/ToolsCalculators/BrokerCheck/P015176. (defining an SRO
as “[a]n entity, such as FINRA or the New York Stock Exchange, responsible for regulating
its members by adopting and enforcing rules that govern its members’ business conduct”);
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activities to ensure that they are meeting all fiduciary and other duties to
their clients. 104 In fact, the old “Shingle Theory” was founded on the
principle that, if you hold yourself out to the public as offering to do
business, you are implicitly representing that you will do so in a fair and
honest manner.” 105 In many instances, the private sector has failed to live
up to its part of the bargain as envisioned by Congress. 106 Thus, the
regulatory oversight model is clearly a shared function in the marketplace
where the federal regulatory infrastructure does not and is not intended to
unilaterally control all aspects of oversight. Indeed, as history has shown,
the private sector must frequently be held accountable by regulation
infused with financial disincentives to avoid the failure to credibly selfregulate. 107
Finally, the passage of the Reform Act signals an attempt by
Congress, in lockstep with the economic policy of macroprudential
regulation heralded by the Federal Reserve Bank, to deal with a bigger
problem; namely, the desperately needed overhaul of an outdated
regulatory infrastructure that is ill-suited to the task of financial regulatory
oversight. 108 Achieving credible regulatory oversight is less likely where
the adeptness of federal agencies anointed with supervisory responsibility
critically lags behind innovative financial products and activities in the
marketplace.
C. Overview: The Divided Roles of the Banking and Security
Regulators
The two primary and intrinsically interrelated financial sectors
identified by the Reform Act include the banking industry and the

104. The SEC requires self-regulatory organizations to register with the SEC.
Registration
Under
the
Securities
Act
of
1933,
SEC
(2013),
http://www.sec.gov/answers/regis33.htm; See also Other Links, SEC (2013),
http://www.sec.gov/links.shtml#selfreg (providing a listing of other SROs).
105. Lori Richards, Director, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, U.S.
SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, Speech at NRS Fall 2000 Compliance Conference: SelfRegulation
in
the
New
Era
(Sept.
11,
2000),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch398.htm [hereinafter Richards].
106. The Watchdogs Didn’t Bark: Enron and The Wall Street Analysts: Hearing Before
the Comm. On Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Sen. Lieberman,
Chairman, Sen. Comm. Governmental Affairs).
107. ACHARYA, V, L. PEDERSEN, T. PHILLIPON AND M. RICHARDSON, N.Y.U. STERN
WHITE PAPERS PROJECT, REGULATING SYSTEMIC RISK, 283-304 (2008).
108. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, GAO 09-216, FINANCIAL
REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO MODERNIZE THE
OUTDATED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM (2009) [hereinafter ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE REPORT].
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securities and futures markets. 109 With some new additions and
modifications created by the Reform Act, the federal regulatory structure is
as follows. In the banking sector, under the functional regulatory model,
multiple federal and state agencies may regulate the same entity based upon
the functionality model described above. 110 However, the primary
supervisor of a domestic banking institution is determined by the type of
institution and the regulator responsible to license its operations. 111 In the
banking industry, that regulatory configuration depends on the type of
charter under which the banking institution operates. 112 State regulators
charter institutions and participate in the oversight of those institutions.
However, all of these institutions have a primary federal regulator if they
offer federal deposit insurance. 113 Additionally, these federal regulators
establish capital requirements for the depository institutions, supervise and
conduct onsite examinations and offsite monitoring to assess an
institution’s financial condition, and monitor and enforce compliance with
banking and consumer laws. 114 The regulators issue regulations, take
enforcement actions, and close institutions determined to be insolvent. 115
The other primary financial sector, the securities and futures sector, is
regulated under a combination of SRO’s, subject to oversight of the
appropriate federal regulator, and direct oversight by the SEC and/or the
CFTC. It is a system grounded upon self-regulation. SROs, such as the
New York Stock Exchange and the AMEX, have responsibility for
oversight of the securities markets and their participants by establishing the
standards for their members; monitoring business conduct; and bringing
disciplinary actions against their members for violating applicable federal
statutes, SEC rules, and SRO rules. 116 The SEC supervises SROs by
inspecting their operations, reviewing SRO rule proposals and appeals of
final disciplinary proceedings. 117 In the futures industry, SROs include the
futures exchanges and the National Futures Association. 118 Futures SROs
109. Reform Act, supra note 12.
110. Reform Act, supra note 12.
111. Reform Act, supra note 12.
112. Reform Act, supra note 12.
113. Reform Act, supra note 12.
114. Reform Act, supra note 12.
115. Reform Act, supra note 12.
116. See Richards, supra note 105 (holding the private sector accountable via financial
disincentives).
117. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, GAO-05-61, FINANCIAL
REGULATION INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY
STRUCTURE 34 (2004).
118. See generally, Self-Regulation and Self-Regulatory Organizations in the Futures
Industry, 70 Fed. Reg. 71090 (Nov. 25, 2005)(describing self-regulatory organizations in
general).
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are responsible for establishing and enforcing rules governing member
conduct and trading; providing for the prevention of market manipulation,
including monitoring trading activity; ensuring that futures industry
professionals meet qualifications; and examining members for financial
strength and other regulatory purposes. 119 The CFTC independently
monitors, among other things, exchange trading activity, large trader
positions, and certain market participants’ financial conditions. 120
Thus, one limitation under current macroprudential policy, viewed
under Nier’s ideal model of information gathering and calibration, is that
functional regulation requiring timely information sharing among
numerous regulators of the same institution remains intact. 121 Additionally,
the policy does not directly impact the system of self-regulation that is a
major component of risk control management in the private sector. 122 The
private sector remains an outsider in terms of stakeholder membership in
the FSOC. Nor does the new policy address in pragmatic terms the impact
of externalities on the ability of various regulatory agencies to engage in
credible oversight. 123
D. The Sources and Limits of Divided Regulatory Oversight Authority
Regulatory agencies have limited powers. 124 Understanding these
limitations on the exercise of agency regulatory authority is critical to
evaluating the likely success of implemented policy that applies Nier’s
model with respect to rulemaking authority and calibration. The Supreme
Court has made clear that regulatory authority to act must always be based
on a specific grant of congressional power. 125 “Regardless of how serious
the problem an administrative agency seeks to address . . . it may not
exercise its authority ‘in a manner that is inconsistent with the
administrative structure that Congress enacted into law.’” 126
There are also legal limitations on the acceptable breadth of agency
interpretations of statutes in the course of drafting implementing

119. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, GAO-05-61, FINANCIAL
REGULATION INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY
STRUCTURE (2004).
120. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, GAO-08-32, INDUSTRY TRENDS
CONTINUE TO CHALLENGE THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2007).
121. Nier, supra note 46, at R1.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000)
(quoting ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 517 (1988)).
125. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp,, 529 U.S. at 125
126. Id.
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regulations. 127 “The power of an administrative agency to administer a
congressionally created and funded program necessarily requires the
formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly
or explicitly, by Congress.” 128 If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the
agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to
implement a specific provision of the statute by regulation. 129 The courts
will accord such legislative regulations “controlling weight” unless they are
“arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” 130 In short,
regulators do not have carte blanche to regulate to prevent harm even if the
result is desirable to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public.
Nor can an agency create corporate governance standards for business or
pass regulations that result in a substantial economic impact in the
marketplace unless Congress accords the rule and policy making authority
to that agency through legislative grant. The agency also has no
independent power to detect and prevent wrongdoing. Here, credible
oversight is restricted to Congressional will and not agency whim.
Thus, the first step in the agency analysis examines the enabling
legislation to determine the scope of each agency’s powers in their
respective oversight roles. The analysis also reviews the seminal court
cases that restrict the boundaries of agency authority under the
congressional mandate. Returning to the definition of credible oversight,
this data illustrates that the operation of the regulatory infrastructure is at
least a function of whether the regulatory agency is doing the job that it is
authorized by law to do. The agency may be doing precisely what it is
authorized to do by law, but may still lack the real authority to prevent a
particular problem. Concomitantly, policy decisions made outside of the
control of a particular regulatory agency may impact the agency’s ability to
control the consequences in the marketplace and create regulatory gaps.
Both situations may interfere with agency supervision and the
implementation of macroprudential policy by federal regulators.

127. See infra notes 128-130 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of
regulations).
128. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974).
129. Id.
130. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
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IV. UNDERSTANING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
REGULATORS AND THE RULES
A. The Securities and Exchange Commission
1. Regulatory model and authority
With the creation of the SEC in 1934, a conscious policy decision was
made about the character of oversight that the new regulatory body was to
exercise over issuers in the marketplace. 131 The model was premised on
self-regulation by issuers, through a system of self-reporting under the
supervision of the regulator. 132 Here, supervision did not vest responsibility
in the regulator to perform internal corporate auditing functions or other
“hands-on” supervision. 133 It was never intended that the SEC would
become the issuer’s accountant. 134 Instead, it was the job of the issuer to
hire credible third party professionals, such as accountants and lawyers, to
perform audits, issue opinion letters, and assist in full and fair disclosure
through a system of documentary reporting to the SEC. 135
Simply, the regulator was to review and inspect only the issuer’s
mandated disclosures, to confirm that it was abiding by the rules. 136
Critical to the model of self-regulation was trust. The regulator was
supposed to be able to rely upon the reporting disclosures of the issuer. 137
That model also required the regulator to actually look at the materials
being submitted by the issuer at least every three years to make such a
determination. 138 Credible oversight in this context meant a hands-off
approach to issuers with, as former SEC Chairman and Supreme Court
Justice William O. Douglas described, the “shotgun behind the door,” in
the event an issuer engaged in improper or unlawful behavior. 139 The SEC
intended barebones agency regulation to avoid interference with natural

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

CORPORATE CRIME, supra note 99.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOV. AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF
ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, S. Prt. 107-75, at 2 (2002), available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-107SPRT82147/pdf/CPRT-107SPRT82147.pdf.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE: THE ADDRESSES AND
STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS AS MEMBER AND CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 82 (James Allen ed., 1940).
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market forces. 140 The notion that respected third party professionals would
not maintain their independence was not accorded much weight. 141 In this
way, private sector issuers were burdened with the obligation to provide
corporate transparency and the regulator was entitled to rely on the
watchful eye of third party professionals ensuring that the issuer satisfied
his burden. 142 These third party professionals were thought of as part of a
class of “corporate watchdogs,” providing actual review and oversight. 143
Indeed, the belief was that the marketplace had a pack of such watchdogs,
including not only accountants and lawyers, but also the self-regulatory
organizations (SRO’s), such as the stock exchanges, investment advisors,
banks and market appraisers. 144 Assuming each watchdog performed its
functions in a conflict-free environment, the risk or opportunity for
corporate wrongdoing would diminish. 145
There is nothing in this legislative model that contemplates anything
more than a supervisory role played by regulators with reliance on
information supplied by the issuer, combined with the reactive power to
punish in the event of a breach of trust. 146 The federal agencies are bound
in a governance partnership with the private sector. 147 This regulatory
philosophy is echoed in the agency philosophy espoused on its website:
“The SEC facilitates the exchange of reliable and necessary information to
enable investors to make informed investment choices.” 148 It is this
legislative model that defines Nier’s key factor, collection of information
directly from the firm to the macroprudential regulator. 149
Periodically, Congress considered increasing the powers of the SEC
and various statutes were added to the arsenal of regulatory enforcement
tools. 150 Yet, the SEC and Congress have steadfastly remained at a

140. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOV. AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF
ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, S. Prt. 107-75, at 2 (2002), available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-107SPRT82147/pdf/CPRT-107SPRT82147.pdf.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. CORPORATE CRIME, supra note 99.
147. Id.
148. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity
and
Facilitates
Capital
Formation,
SEC,
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml [hereinafter The Investor’s Advocate].
149. Nier, supra note 46, at R1.
150. See
generally
How
Investigations
Work,
SEC,
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/1356125787012#.UioX-D9gHmM
(providing an overview of the historical development of the SEC’s role and law
enforcement powers).
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respectful distance to avoid undue interference in the marketplace. That
philosophy is embedded in the federal regulations which require the SEC to
consider, in addition to protection of the investors, whether the proposed
regulatory action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation in the market. 151 As noted below, the IG has recently chastised
the SEC for its failure to follow this mandate in its current efforts to create
new implementing regulations under the Reform Act. 152 As such, the
model creates a need for the SEC to serve two masters in the marketplace,
investors and an efficient market. However, those interests do not always
coincide.
Thus, the regulator is intended to supervise a system of self-regulation
and enforce reactively in response to self-regulatory failure. This model of
“credible oversight” was created by Congress based upon a myriad of
policy considerations and political interests.
Indeed, trust as the
cornerstone of marketplace regulation is still urged as the best regulatory
model today. 153 This philosophy may directly impact the scope and breadth
of regulation designed to manage risk under the Reform Act. In short,
macroprudential regulation is not intended to supplant the “hands-off”
economic philosophy that has historically characterized the congressional
response to market failure.
2. Recent oversight initiatives
In the wake of the Enron debacle, the SEC was severely criticized for
its failure to have provided credible oversight. 154 Responding to the crisis,
Congress enacted several new oversight provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (SOX) increasing both the supervisory powers and responsibilities of
the SEC and the disclosure obligations of the private sector, including: 1)
annual reports to the SEC must include an assessment of management’s
internal controls and must be attested to by the auditing firm; 2) the SEC
must conduct enhanced review of certain issuer disclosures in periodic
reports issued on a regular and systematic basis for protection of investors;

151. The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 148.
152. SEC INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, SEC’S OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND
RELATED ENTITIES: BROKER-DEALER RISK ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (2008), http://www.secoig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/2008/446-b.pdf.
153. Donaldson, supra note 98.
154. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOV. AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF
ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, S. Prt. 107-75, at 5 (2002), available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-107SPRT82147/pdf/CPRT-107SPRT82147.pdf
(“[T]he SEC’s interactions with Enron reveal the downside to the Commission’s largely
reactive approach to market regulation and should provide an impetus for the Commission
to reorient some of its activities toward more proactive anti-fraud measures”).
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and, 3) directors and officers must certify financial information contained
in their own periodic reports submitted to the SEC. 155
Was this change in oversight initiatives perceived as enough to fix the
problem? There is no unified response to that question. Instead, there exists
a difference of opinion among the concerned stakeholders about how to
define the real problem in the first instance. Lynn Turner, former SEC
chief auditor, saw the problem differently. 156 He concluded that current
unbridled lending practices contributing to the mortgage crisis reflected a
failure of all of the operative parts of the current regulatory model. 157 In a
statement before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs on Enhancing Investor Protection and Regulation of the Securities
Markets in 2009, Turner concluded: “While lenders were making bad loans
in exchange for an upfront fee, and gatekeepers were falling down on the
job, federal government agencies were failing to supervise or regulate those
under their oversight, as well as failing to enforce laws.” 158 He also noted
that the lack of regulation of new products also contributed to the failure. 159
For Turner, however, the problem is not necessarily solved by
promulgating more rules. 160 Instead, the problem is solved by getting the
stakeholders to comply with existing rules. 161
Finally, some observers question whether the regulatory partnership
model between the government and the private sector has any validity and
view this partnership with great cynicism. 162 They argue that the
partnership model of self-regulation and government oversight breeds an
incestuous relationship between government regulators and the private
sector, which dilutes credible oversight. 163 There is no set of rules designed
to fix this public perception.

155. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
156. See generally Enhancing Investor Protection and Regulation of the Securities
Markets: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 111 Cong.
(March 10, 2009) (statement of Lynn Turner, former S.E.C. Chief Auditor) (“There are
really three root causes of this problem: people made bad loans, gatekeepers sold out, and a
lack of regulation or regulators missing in action, quite frankly. And it is not the first
time.”).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. HARRY MARKOPOLOS, NO ONE WOULD LISTEN: A TRUE FINANCIAL THRILLER (John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2010).
163. Id.
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3. Evaluating the regulator
It is worth revisiting SEC Director Richard’s argument that risk-based
examination programs were in place and suitable to prevent and detect risk
during the most critical periods of economic failure. 164 Was the SEC’s
voluntary risk-based oversight program, developed post-Enron, a success
or part of a failed oversight paradigm? Concededly, the programs missed
Bernard Madoff’s simplistic Ponzi scheme but they did manage to “catch”
Bear Sterns. However, the 2008 Report issued by the IG, in connection
with the SEC oversight of Bear Sterns under the Consolidated Supervised
Entity (CSE) Program, questioned the real efficacy of CSE program in
view of the fact that Bear Stearns was found to be in compliance with most
of the regulations but still became insolvent. 165 The SEC promulgated the
regulations, Bear Stearns complied with the regulations, and Bear Stearns
failed. 166
A second IG report addressing SEC oversight of Bear Stearns under
the Broker-Dealer Risk Assessment Program concluded that the SEC’s
Division of Trading and Markets was not fulfilling its oversight obligations
under the program and that concerns raised by the IG’s audit of the
program in 2002 had not been adequately addressed by the SEC. 167 Nearly
one third of the firms under the Broker-Dealer Risk Assessment program
had not even filed the required documents. 168 The division had not
adequately reviewed the filings made by others. 169 The IG concluded that
the failure to carry out the purpose and goals of the broker-dealer risk
assessment program “hinders the Commission’s ability to foresee or
respond to weaknesses in the financial markets.” 170 However, these
conclusions fueled not only a difference of opinion but also precipitated an
angry outburst by the SEC.
In response to the IG criticism, then SEC Chairman, Christopher Cox,
conceded that the CSE program, created in 2004 in response to the
lobbying efforts from the investment banking industry, was “fundamentally
flawed from the very beginning” because investment banks could opt in or
out of supervision voluntarily. 171 But Cox blamed Congress for the failure
164. Richards, supra note 105.
165. SEC INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, SEC’S OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND
RELATED ENTITIES: BROKER-DEALER RISK ASSESSMENT PROGRAM
(2008),
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig/reports/audits/2008/446-b.pdf.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at v.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Stephen Labaton, SEC Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse, N.Y. TIMES,
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of the program. 172 The fact that investment bank holding companies were
intentionally excluded from regulation by Congress by allowing them to
withdraw from voluntary supervision at their discretion diminished the
perceived mandate of the program and weakened its effectiveness. 173
Subsequently, Cox disbanded the CSE program, but only after the demise
or reorganization of the five biggest Wall Street firms, including Bear
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and Goldman
Sachs. 174
Cox’s view that the supervisory debacle was the direct result of a
“regulatory gap” created by Congress has support in the legislative history
of deregulation. 175 Some hindsight is useful here. In 1999, Congress passed
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) reversing the earlier restrictions
between investment banks and commercial bank activities. 176 The law
authorized the SEC to regulate only the securities and brokerage operations
of the investment banks, but not their holding companies. 177 A gaping
regulatory loophole hampered the SEC’s ability to control holding
company financial activities. 178 In 2002, the European Union, sensing an
impending crisis in the unregulated holding company arena, sought to
impose its own rules on unregulated holding companies unless they were
otherwise regulated domestically. 179 To avoid being subjected to the reach
of European Union oversight, the investment banks lobbied the SEC to
promulgate the voluntary CSE program. 180 The program was arguably a
sham designed to protect the political interests of the investment banking
community and avoid government regulation where there was otherwise no
clear intention to self-regulate.
While disbanding the CSE program, Cox publicly warned that the
same regulatory gap existed in the unregulated credit default swap

Sept. 26, 2008 at A1 (quoting SEC Chairman, Christopher Cox) [hereinafter Labaton].
172. Press Release 2008-230, SEC, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated
Supervised
Entities
Program
(Sept.
26,
2008),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-230.htm [hereinafter Press Release 2008-230,
SEC].
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801 et seq.) (summarizing the provisions of the Gramm-LeachBliley Act, also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act, including the
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) amendments).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Labaton, supra note 171.
180. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, supra note 108.
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industry. 181 Later, in testimony before Congress, then FDIC Chair Born
recommended that Congress close the same regulatory gap. 182 Both
warnings were preceded by the earlier efforts of the GAO, which reported
that the large financial interconnections between derivatives dealers posed
risk to the financial system and recommended that Congress and financial
regulators take action to ensure that the largest firms participating in the
OTC derivatives markets be subject to regulatory oversight. 183 Those
repeated agency demands were vehemently opposed by Alan Greenspan,
then FRB chairman, Lawrence Summers, and Robert Rubin in testimony
The argument of the “Greenspan bloc” was
before Congress. 184
straightforward: policymakers need to ensure that systemic regulation is
balanced with other national goals, including facilitating capital raising and
Booming economic prosperity solidified
fostering innovation. 185
Congressional agreement with Greenspan. 186 Now, the massive market
failure has bred increased suspicion of an incestuous relationship between
government regulators and the private sector. 187
The sustained but unheeded efforts of the SEC, the FDIC and the
GAO also aptly illustrate that the agency may be doing precisely what it is
authorized to do, but may still lack the real authority to prevent the problem
by virtue of regulatory gaps existing in the regulatory framework. The
agency may not unilaterally act beyond the scope of its legislative grant of
authority to solve an obvious and dangerous problem. Concomitantly,
policy decisions made outside of the control of these regulatory agencies;
namely, Congressional deference to the “Greenspan bloc,” clearly impacted
the agencies’ ability to control the consequences in the marketplace. 188
4. Reform Act remediation
In an effort to remediate the problem, the Reform Act has added two
oversight “loop closing” features for previously unregulated derivatives

181. Press Release 2008-230, SEC, supra note 172; STAFF OF S. COMM. ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG. 2ND SESS., REP. ON THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF
ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, 31-36 (Comm. Print 2002).
182. Born, supra note 90.
183. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REP., GAO/GGD-94-133, FINANCIAL
DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM (1994).
184. See Frontline, supra note 92 (examining early warnings and failures concerning the
financial crisis of 2007).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL REP. OF THE NAT’L COMM’N. ON THE CAUSES
OF THE FIN. AND ECON. CRISIS IN THE U.S. (2011), http://www.fcic.gov/report.
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and hedge funds. 189 First, private equity and hedge funds with assets of
$150 million dollars or more must register with the SEC. 190 Venture capital
funds remain exempt from full registration. 191 Second, the “Volcker rule”
bars proprietary trading unrelated to customer’s needs at government
backed banks. 192 Additionally, credit exposure to banks from derivative
transactions must now be added to banks’ lending limits. 193
In 2012, the IG performed a cost-benefit analysis of the SEC’s rule
making activities under the Reform Act. 194 The IG concluded in the audit
report that:
[S]ome SEC Dodd-Frank Act rulemakings lacked clear, explicit
explanations of the justification for regulatory action.
Specifically, some of the rulemakings that were premised on
market failure alluded to market failure but did not explicitly cite
it as a justification or fully discuss it. Other rulemakings included
language that erroneously suggested a market failure justification
and contained no compelling alternative rationale in support of
the action. OMB Circular A-4 identifies market failure as one of
several possible justifications for federal agency regulation. In
discussing this point, the circular provides that an agency must
demonstrate that proposed action is necessary before
recommending regulatory action. 195
Thus, a disconnect between the proposed regulations and the causes of
the market failure may contribute to a flawed implementation of
macroprudential policy in the future if court review concludes that the
agency has failed to follow the limitations of its rulemaking authority. In
any case, piling more regulations on to the industry without a direct impact
on the specific causes of market failure fails to achieve the goal of
macroprudential reform.

189. See Reform Act, supra note 12 (providing links to summaries of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, including the full text, related bills and
other information regarding the Act’s legislative history).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. SEC INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT NO. 499, FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF COST BENEFIT
ANALYSIS IN SELECTED SEC DODD-FRANK RULEMAKINGS (2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig/reports/audits/2012/rpt499_followupreviewofdf_costbenefitanalyses_508.pdf.
195. Id.
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B. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
1. Regulatory model and authority
Under the Grain Futures Act of 1922, trading of futures contracts was
supervised by the Department of Agriculture through the Grain Futures
Administration. 196 As part of the legislative fix to the financial crisis
resulting in the “Great Depression,” Congress passed the Commodity
Exchange Act (CEA) in 1936 and created the Commodity Exchange
The CEC established the Grain Futures
Commission (CEC). 197
Administration. 198 More than forty years passed until 1974 when Congress
reorganized the CEC into the modern day CFTC under the Commodities
Futures Trading Act (CFTA). 199 The CFTA is generally crafted to regulate
futures trading. 200 Futures contracts allow purchasers to buy or sell a
specific quantity of a commodity for delivery in the future. 201 While
traders are required to register with the CFTC and maintain certain
minimum capital requirements, the registration functions were delegated to
the National Futures Association, a SRO, by regulation. 202
The CFTC regulatory oversight model tracks the SEC model. 203 The
regulations are crafted to protect the public interest through a system of
“effective self-regulation” of trading facilities, clearing systems, market
participants and market professionals under the CFTC oversight. 204 The
CFTC has jurisdiction over most futures and options contracts, whether
traded on an exchange or over the counter (OTC trading). 205 However, the
authority to regulate the securities markets is divided between the SEC and
the CFTC in conformity with the functionality model described above. 206
The SEC regulates the functions of the securities and securities options

196. Grain Futures Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 998 (1922) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.).
197. Commodities Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936); History of
the CFTC, U.S. COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, available at
http://www.cftc.gov/index.htm [hereinafter History of the CFTC].
198. History of the CFTC, supra note 197.
199. Commodities Futures Trading Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 93-463 (1974);
Mission & Responsibilities U.S. COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,
http://www.cftc.gov/index.htm [hereinafter Mission & Responsibilities].
200. Commodities Futures Trading Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 93-463 (1974).
201. Id.
202. Who We Are, NATIONAL FUTURES ASSOCIATION, http://www.nfa.futures.org/ (last
visited April 25, 2014).
203. See Mission & Responsibilities, supra note 199.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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markets. The CFTC regulates the functions of most other markets. 207
Moreover, there are numerous regulatory gaps created by law in
regard to the OTC regulatory function. The CEA excludes from CFTC
regulatory oversight most over the counter (OTC) financial derivatives,
including credit default swaps. 208 In 2000, the Commodities Futures
Modernization Act “clarified” that some off-exchange trading would be
permitted and remain largely unregulated, including hedge funds. 209 Both
forms of trading, now excoriated as the culprits of the current financial
crisis, were thus intentionally excluded from regulatory oversight by
Congress. 210 The CFTC was denied the authority by Congress to supervise
these financial products. 211 This statutory model has been amended in
some measure by recent changes made by the Reform Act. 212 However,
until the enabling regulations are in place, the meaning of those changes
will remain somewhat of an unknown. This is particularly true where the
system of parallel regulation between the SEC and the CFTC remains in
place after the passage of the Reform Act.
Section 3 of the CFTA authorizes three supervisory activities under
the CFTC regulatory structure: 1) to protect the price discovery function; 2)
to prevent the manipulation of commodities through trading schemes; and,
3) to assure an effective vehicle for risk transference. 213 While the financial
futures market includes both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors,
the OTC market is comprised mostly of professional broker dealers and
institutional investors. 214 Also, the challenge of overseeing the regulation
of financial futures is considered functionally different than regulating
metals futures, energy futures, or agricultural futures. 215 So, the agency has
207. U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, Report on Oversight of Trading
on Regulated Futures Exchanges and Exempt Commercial Markets (2007),
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/pr540307_ecmreport.pdf.
208. Commodities Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936).
209. Commodities Future Modernization Act of 2000, H.R. 4541, 106th Cong. (2000).
210. See Id. (explaining the significance of exchange-traded and OTC derivative
instruments to our economy due to their risk-transferring attributes).
211. History of the CFTC, supra note 197. See also Mission & Responsibilities, supra
note 199.
212. See Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, Title
X, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Reform Act] (expanding the joint rule-making
authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission in consultation with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
213. Commodities Futures Trading Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 93-463 (1974)
[hereinafter CFTC ACT].
214. William Rainer, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Remarks at
the Twenty Second Annual Chicago-Kent College of Law Derivatives and Commodities
Institute (Oct. 28, 1999), http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches/oparainer-2.htm.
215. Id.
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been required to reject a “one-size fits all” regulatory approach in its
oversight function. 216
2. Recent oversight initiatives
In 1998, the CFTC attempted to regulate derivatives. 217 Under the
leadership of its Chair, Brooksley Born, the CFTC issued a “Concept
Release” aimed at market reform through the regulation and oversight of
the OTC derivatives market. 218 Born believed that this unregulated “dark
market” could pose grave dangers to the economy. 219 Alan Greenspan,
Robert Rubin and Larry Summers testified before Congress in opposition
to the attempt at regulation. 220 The Greenspan bloc was successful in
derailing regulatory efforts with the passage of the Commodities Future
Modernization Act passed in 2000. 221 The CFMA, which exempted most
OTC derivatives from regulation, often referred to as the “Enron loophole,”
is now also blamed for the current financial crisis. 222
Significantly, the explosive growth of trading in unregulated hedge
fund portfolios and OTC derivatives during the period 1999-2004 was
preceded by the near catastrophic failure of Long Term Capital
Management (LTCM). In fact, the LTCM failure proved that Born had
accurately predicted the crisis. LTCM experienced large losses related to its
$100 billion trading position in hedge funds. 223 Viewed as a precursor to a
global meltdown, the Clinton administration and the FRB pressured the
financial institutions with large exposure to the hedge funds to provide $3.6
billion as a cushion until the fund could be liquidated in an orderly
fashion. 224 Despite the attempts of Born, the SEC’s Christopher Cox and
others, the regulatory gap has persisted until the recent passage of the

216. Id.
217. Born, supra note 90.
218. Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26114, 26115 (May 12, 1998),
http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press98/opamntn.htm.
219. See id. (asserting that OTC derivatives “can present significant risks if misused or
misunderstood by market participants” and that “well publicized, financial losses over the
last few years have focused the attention of the financial services industry [and] its
regulators. . .on potential problems and abuses in the OTC derivatives market”).
220. See Frontline, supra note 92 (discussing how the statements of the “Working
Group,” including Alan Greenspan and Robert Rubin, ultimately dissuaded leaders from
supporting Born’s attempts to regulate the “risky derivatives market” prior to the 2008
financial crisis).
221. Commodities Future Modernization Act of 2000, H.R. 4541, 106th Cong. (2000).
222. Id.
223. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, supra note 108.
224. Id.
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Reform Act. 225 The meltdown that was predicted, experienced in the
LTCM debacle, experienced in the energy trades conducted by Enron, and
repeated by Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs, most major
U.S. and foreign financial institutions, and many others, is a main
contributor to the current financial crisis. 226 In short, Federal Reserve Bank
economic policy, supported by Congress, directly impacted the regulator’s
ability to engage in credible regulatory oversight of an entirely unregulated
dark market creating risk exposure in the trillions. 227 This was directly
contrary to the original agency oversight purposes envisioned by Congress
under the CFTA. 228
3. Evaluating the regulator
The IG issued an audit report covering the period October 2009March 2010 evaluating the performance of the CFTC. 229 The IG identified
three “most serious” management challenges: Congressional demand that
the CFTC and SEC harmonize their regulation of overlapping financial
products; a decision on the CFTC’s regulatory model for the swaps
derivatives market; and expansion of CFTC’s regulatory responsibilities
over the potential carbon emission trading markets. 230
Yet, neither the IG nor the GAO has much to say about the CFTC.
The agency’s struggle over the last twenty years to take its place in the
formal regulatory structure was effectively extinguished in 2000 with the
passage of the Commodities Futures Modernization Act permitting offexchange trading that would remain largely unregulated. 231 The CFTC’s
struggle underscores the potency of externality impact on credible
oversight. The culprit is arguably Congress. Not only did Congress refuse
to heed the CFTC’s warning, it passed affirmative legislation shutting the
door on any regulation at all.
4. Reform Act remediation
The Reform Act authorizes the SEC and the CFTC to form a joint

225. Weismann, supra note 29 at 26.
226. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, supra note 108..
227. Id.
228. CFTC ACT, supra note 214.
229. U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL,
Semiannual Report of the Office of the Inspector General (April 30, 2010), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/oigsar033110.pdf.
230. Id.
231. Commodities Future Modernization Act of 2000, H.R. 4541, 106th Cong. (2000).

WEISMANN, PETERSON, AND BUSCAGLIA_FINAL (ARTICLE 2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1064

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

8/28/2014 2:31 PM

[Vol. 16.4

commission to identify emergency issues and regulatory risks, assess their
implications for market participants and recommend solutions. 232
Modernization of the regulatory infrastructure has begun with the
expansion of CFTC regulatory authority under the Reform Act, also known
as “Derivative Markets Transparency and Accountability Act of 2009.” 233
Along with the SEC, the CFTC is authorized to commence rulemaking
with regard to swaps and the swap related entities and participants. 234
Specifically, the SEC has the authority to regulate security-based swaps. 235
The CFTC now has primary regulatory authority over swaps, the majority
of the overall market for the over-the-counter derivatives. 236 Regulatory
changes will be recommended to Congress for implementation in the
derivatives market. 237 The agencies will also recommend legislative
changes to federal insolvency laws. 238 The Act further extends the CFTC’s
authority to regulate derivatives and repeals numerous legislative
prohibitions. 239 Accordingly, the Reform Act continues to maintain a
parallel system of regulatory authority or functional regulation as part of
the new plan. 240
Most significantly, the Reform Act repeals the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act prohibition against the regulation of security based swap agreements. 241
The CFTC initiated the rule making process by dividing thirty proposed
topic areas into eight groups including comprehensive regulation of swap
dealers and major swap participants; clearing; trading; enforcement;
position limits; and, others. 242
The expansion of the CFTC’s rulemaking authority does address
Nier’s factor of sending a stronger mandate to the agency than was
heretofore characterized by the CFMA, which was enacted to intentionally
emasculate the agency. 243 Despite the current reform mandate, however,

232. Reform Act, supra note 12.
233. Derivative Markets Transparency and Accountability Act of 2009, H.R. 977, 111th
Cong. (2009).
234. Reform Act, supra note 232.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Rule Making Areas, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,
http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/Rulemakings/index.htm.
243. See NIER, supra note 46, at 216 (exploring questions raised by the “strong effort to
make a new macroprudential orientation operational” in response to the “recognition that
prior to the global financial crisis financial regulation had lacked a macroprudential
perspective”).
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Congress has sent mixed signals to the agency and the private sector
market participants over the last decade. 244 That confusion has interfered
with information collection and calibration. 245 Even the best rules cannot
quickly overcome the legislative practices of the past.
Parenthetically, the Congressional Budget Office previously estimated
that up to 235 additional employees would be needed by the CFTC by
fiscal year 2011 to regulate central counterparty clearing of swaps. 246 This
estimate required a forty percent increase over existing staffing levels. 247
The estimate provided a window into the sheer magnitude of the agency’s
new regulatory role under the Reform Act and illustrates the massive
hurdles faced by the CFTC in its continuing efforts to comply with its new
obligations without adequate staffing.
C. Federal Reserve Board
1. Regulatory Model and Authority
In 1913, the Federal Reserve System, which serves as the nation’s
central bank, was created by federal law. 248 The law requires that the FRB
report on at least an annual basis to Congress. 249 It provides a list of
specific responsibilities, which includes: the formulation of monetary
policy; setting the discount rate; regulating and supervising member banks;
suspending, liquidating or restructuring troubled banking institutions; and
setting standards for reserve requirements and worthless assets. 250 The
Federal Reserve shares functional supervisory and regulatory
responsibilities for domestic banking institutions with the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
and the Office of Thrift Supervision, now merged into the OCC. 251 Banks
are often owned or controlled by bank holding companies. 252 Here, the

244. Id.
245. Id.
246. GARY GENSLER, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, INSPECTOR
GENERAL’S
FISCAL
YEAR
2009
ASSESSMENT
(Nov.
16,
2009),
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/oigmgmtchall2009.pdf.
247. Id.
248. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 113-31, § 226, 38 Stat. 251 (1913),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/section1.htm.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM: PURPOSE AND FUNCTIONS 59
(9th ed., 2005), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf.
252. Id.
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FRB has supervisory authority for all bank holding companies, regardless
of whether the subsidiary bank of the holding company is a national bank,
state member bank, or state nonmember bank. 253
The history of the FRB rulemaking authority illustrates the point made
earlier – that the regulatory authority of federal agencies is limited to the
investiture of express powers by Congress and where the agency attempts
to expand its supervisory power, even in the interests of preventing a
societal harm caused by increased systemic risk, it will be prohibited from
doing so. 254 This may result in a regulatory gap that hinders credible
regulatory oversight. 255 Case in point: In 1986, the Supreme Court struck
down a federal regulation promulgated by the FRB under the Bank Holding
Company Act, which gave the Board regulatory authority to supervise
nonbank financial institutions offering the “functional equivalent” of
banking services provided to customers by banks. 256 The Court observed
that the Act gave a simple and broad definition of a bank as “any national
banking association or any State bank, savings bank, or trust company” and
exempted from regulation all institutions that did not engage in the
business of making commercial loans. 257 The message was clear: all other
nonbank financial institutions not included in the statutory definition were
simply outside of the FRB’s rulemaking authority. 258 Thus, insurance
institutions providing functionally equivalent banking services, like AIG,
escaped FRB oversight. 259 By virtue of the passage of the Reform Act, the
statute was not expanded to permit nonbank financial companies to come
within the regulatory purview of the FRB until after the AIG debacle. 260
2. Evaluating the Regulator
The FRB was one of the federal agencies not technically subject to the
audit and reporting requirements of the GPRA. 261 Nonetheless, it chose to
voluntarily comply with the Act. In any case, the Reform Act now requires
a special audit by the GAO of “FRB governance.” 262 Specifically, the

253. Id.
254. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp. et. al., 474 U.S.
361 (1986).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See Reform Act, supra note 12.
261. FED. RESERVE BOARD, 2011 GPRA PERFORMANCE REPORT 1 (2011),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/gpra/files/2011-gpra-performance-report.pdf.
262. Id.
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auditors must determine the extent to which FRB governance adequately
represents the public and whether there are any conflicts of interest when
member banks elect the members of the FRB. 263
A recent IG Report for the period April 1, 2010 through September
30, 2010 omits any reference to public criticism that FRB economic policy
may have fueled the current economic crisis. 264 Yet, many others have
criticized the Board, including the FCIC, for facilitating the credit crisis
through its promulgation of loose monetary policy and low interest rates in
the period post 9/11, which was characterized by the undetected corporate
failures of Enron and WorldCom. 265 As a consequence, the financial system
Banks, mortgage companies,
was flooded with available cash. 266
institutional investors, and the unregulated hedge funds engaged in
increased risk to generate ever higher returns in a weak dollar/low interest
Notably, the Board also opposed
rate/cheap asset environment. 267
regulation of derivatives in opposition to the demands of another federal
agency, the CFTC. 268 Thus, lax economic policy combined with limited
regulatory authority over nonbank financial institutions has fueled the
claim that the Board failed to act in the public interest. More recently, the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report, released on January 27, 2011,
targeted the FRB for its failure to avert the crisis: “The prime example is
the Federal Reserve’s pivotal failure to stem the ﬂow of toxic mortgages,
which it could have done by setting prudent mortgage-lending standards.
The Federal Reserve was the one entity empowered to do so and it did
not.” 269
The GAO report issued in January 2009 provided a different twist
regarding the perceived failure of financial regulatory oversight.270 It is not
so much a critique of the FRB, or any other federal regulator for that
matter, but instead focuses on the absence of macroprudential coordination
between regulatory agencies and the externalities that impede credible

263. Id.
264. See Semiannual Report of the Office of the Inspector General, supra note 229.
265. Id.
266. See Bodine, supra note 81 (commenting on the subprime mortgage crisis).
267. Id.
268. Concerning Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market
and Hybrid Instruments: House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs. (July 24, 1998)
(testimony of Richard R. Lindsey, Director, Division of Market Regulation, Securities and
Exchange
Commission),
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testarchive/1998/tsty0898.htm#body4.
269. THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF THE NAT’L COMM. ON THE
CAUSES OF THE FIN. AND ECON. CRISIS IN THE U.S. (2011), available at
http://www.fcic.gov/report.
270. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, supra note 108.
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regulatory oversight. 271 Those externalities include the “too big to fail”
scenario that characterized the collapse of AIG, the demise of the
investment bank model where investment banks utilized publicly traded
holding companies with broker-dealer subsidiaries dealing in largely
unregulated markets due to the regulatory gaps created by the GLBA, and
the failure of the private sector to self-regulate and exercise restraint. 272 In
short, the GAO report describes a runaway market not subject to sound
regulation and able to evade oversight. 273
3. Reform Act Remediation
During congressional hearings in 2008, FRB officials acknowledged a
failure of big picture regulatory supervision. 274 It observed that under the
pre-Reform Act regulatory structure consisting of multiple agencies,
difficulties can arise in assessing risk profiles of large, complex financial
institutions which operate across financial sectors, particularly given the
increased use of sophisticated financial products that can generate risk
across various entities. 275 In addition to the creation of the FSOC under the
Reform Act to coordinate agency supervision, a newly created position of
Vice-President of Supervision has been added to the regulatory
infrastructure. This requires the FRB to make recommendations to
Congress regarding the supervision and regulation of financial
institutions. 276
Likewise, the solution to the “too big to fail problem,” where the very
size and nature of the nonbank financial institutions insulated them from
regulatory oversight and market discipline, may now be a function of
government regulation. 277 Under the Reform Act, the FSOC may subject a
“US nonbank financial company” to FRB supervision and to “prudential
standards.” 278 The FSOC must first determine by a two-thirds vote,
including an affirmative vote by the Chairperson, that “material financial
distress” exists at the nonbank financial company, or the “nature, scope,
size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the activities”
could pose a threat to U.S. financial stability. 279 It is important to note that
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs: Condition of the Banking
System, 110th Congres 2nd Sess. (2008).
275. Id.
276. Id. supra note 252.
277. Id.
278. Id. supra note 252.
279. Id.
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nonbank financial companies still remain effectively outside of regulatory
supervision unless the FSOC exercises its discretion as provided for under
the Act. 280 It remains to be seen whether this model will effectively
remediate the regulatory gap.
The Reform Act may close the regulatory gap created by Congress’
previous intransigence in excluding from FRB oversight large nonbank
financial institutions, including insurance companies like AIG, even if they
have no bank or thrift subsidiary. 281 Here, the impact of externalities,
namely Congress and economic policy, undoubtedly impacted credible
regulatory oversight and the successful implementation of macroprudential
policy. The FRB argues that it was doing its job according to its legal
mandate. 282 It simply lacked the authority to effectively supervise systemic
risk. 283
D. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
1. Regulatory Model and Authority
The Banking Act of 1933 created the FDIC to administer a federal
program insuring bank deposits of participating banks. 284 As such, the
FDIC was another regulatory brainchild of the Great Depression. In 1989,
with the abolition of the Federal Savings and Loan Corporation (FSLIC),
the now defunct Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) assumed FSLIC’s
regulatory function over thrifts. 285 With the advent of the Wall Street
Reform Act, OTS was summarily abolished and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) assumed the duties of the OTS. 286 Thrifts are savings
and loan financial institutions, primarily engaged in the home mortgage
business. 287 The FDIC provides two oversight functions referred to as
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. MARC LABONTE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE SYSTEMIC RISK AND THE
FEDERAL
RESERVE,
6-7
(2009),
,
http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Systemic_Risk_and_the_Federal_Reserve.pdf.
283. Id.
284. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
285. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
286. Id. supra note 251.
287. See generally Steven Pilloff & Robin Prager, Thrift Involvement in Commercial
RESERVE
BULLETIN,
Dec.
1998,
and
Industrial
Lending,
FEDERAL
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/1998/199812lead.pdf (considering the weight
that should be given to thrift institutions as actual or potential competitors of commercial
banks in providing ﬁnancial services).
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primary and “backup” or secondary oversight. 288 The FDIC is responsible
for primary oversight of any state-chartered bank that is not a member of
the Federal Reserve System. 289 In this capacity, it serves as the primary
federal regulator for over 5,200 state-chartered institutions. 290 Similar to
other insurers, the FDIC monitors and assesses risks at all insured financial
institutions and determines each institution’s insurance risk category and
premium rate. 291 The FDIC regulations then assign each risk category a
specific insurance assessment rate that is used to compute an institution’s
insurance premium, which is added to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). 292
The FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) required the FDIC to
establish a risk-based assessment system. 293 A risk-based system is one
based on an institution’s probability of causing a loss to the DIF due to the
composition and concentration of the institution’s assets and liabilities, the
amount of loss given failure, and the revenue needs of the fund. 294 To
implement that requirement, the FDIC categorized institutions into risk
categories based on two regulatory criterion: (1) capital levels; and, (2)
supervisory ratings as calculated by the primary regulatory agency sharing
functional oversight of the institution. 295 With the passage of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Reform Act Conforming Amendments of 2005, the FDIC was statutorily
required to set institutional risk assessments semiannually. 296 The new
provisions continued to require that the assessment system be risk-based,
however, risk was more broadly defined. 297 Yet, the integrity of the
FDIC’s oversight evaluation still rested upon the supervisory ratings
calculated by the primary regulatory agency.

288. See generally EDWARD MURPHY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, WHO
REGULATES WHOM AND HOW? AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY POLICY FOR
BANKING AND SECURITIES MARKETS, , (2013) http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43087.pdf
[hereinafter MURPHY] (breaking down the regulation scheme of banks and securities
markets).
289. Id.
290. 2013 Annual Performance Plan: Insurance Program, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
available at http://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/performance/insurance.html.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1811).
DEPOSIT
INS.
CORP.
294. Reform
of
Deposit
Insurance,
FED.
http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/reform.html#rbas.
295. MURPHY, supra note 288.
296. Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 110 Stat. 9
(2005); Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act Conforming Amendments of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-173, 119 Stat. 3601 (2005).
297. Id.

WEISMANN, PETERSON, AND BUSCAGLIA_FINAL (ARTICLE 2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

THE NEW MACROPRUDENTIAL REFORM PARADIGM

8/28/2014 2:31 PM

1071

The focus here is on the secondary or backup examination and
enforcement authority of the FDIC over all of the institutions it insures in
order to prevent or mitigate losses to deposit insurance funds. It is here
where the FDIC’s regulatory authority has been most limited. This
explains, in large measure, the reasons that the FDIC was unable to
effectively prevent major bank failures during the recent financial crisis as
a result of these regulatory restrictions. As the word back-up implies, the
bank in question has a primary regulator other than the FDIC in charge of
examination and supervision. This is part of the system of functional
regulation. Along with the primary regulator, the FDIC as the insurer has
authority to perform its own examination of a federally insured bank and
impose enforcement actions to protect the DIF, provided statutory and
regulatory procedures are followed. 298
Parenthetically, the interagency agreement between the FDIC and the
primary regulator was “intended to balance the needs of FDIC against the
regulatory burden on an institution of having two regulators duplicating
examinations.” 299 Another critical aspect of the interagency “agreement is
that the FDIC must rely, “to the fullest extent possible, on the work of the
primary regulator.” 300
Additionally, “the terms of the interagency
agreement governing information sharing and back-up examinations
require that the FDIC prove a requisite level of risk at an institution –
heightened risk, material deteriorating conditions, or adverse developments
– in order for the primary regulator to grant the FDIC access to the
institution’s information.” 301 Accordingly, where the primary regulator is
not doing its job, the FDIC must still establish the requisite level of risk to
obtain access to critical internal information. 302 Strangely, that access is
limited to the audit results of the primary regulator that has failed to do its
job in the first instance. 303 A clear breakdown under Nier’s model of
information gathering and calibration.
This regulatory paradigm was reviewed in detail by the IG during its
audit of the FDIC and the OTS in its “evaluation of the federal regulatory
oversight” immediately preceding the failure of Washington Mutual Bank

298. MURPHY, supra note 288.
299. Role of Regulators Exercising Their Supervision of Washington Mutual Bank from
2004-2008: Hearing Before the Perm. Sen. Subcomm. on Investigations Comm. On
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, (2010) (statement of John Rymer, Inspector
General, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
300. Id.
301. OFFICES OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FED. DEPOSIT
INS. CORP., EVAL-10-002, EVALUATION OF REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF WASHINGTON
MUTUAL BANK (2010), http://www.fdicoig.gov/reports10/Eval-10-002-508.shtml.
302. Id.
303. Id.
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(WaMu). The IG concluded that the procedures governing the FDIC’s
backup authority were unduly restrictive and prevented the FDIC from
adequately performing its regulatory function. 304 An absence of “big
picture” focus contributed to a regulatory gap. 305
2. Recent oversight initiatives
The story of the failure of Washington Mutual (WaMu) perhaps best
illustrates the importance of macroprudential regulation. 306 The failure of
FDIC oversight initiatives as a result of regulatory compartmentalization
supports the IG’s conclusion that the FDIC’s hands were tied by
regulations which prevented it from effectively doing its job of credible
regulatory oversight and preventing WaMu’s downfall. 307
WaMu’s primary federal regulator was the OTS. 308 As such, OTS was
responsible for conducting full-scope examinations to assess WaMu’s
safety and soundness and compliance with consumer protection laws. 309
Unfortunately, OTS relied in large measure on WaMu’s own internal audit
system to track the thrift’s progress. 310 Parenthetically, the reliance on the
private sector’s own judgment effectively replaced the independent role of
the primary regulator. 311 Later facts revealed that WaMu’s management
pursued an unreasonably high-risk lending strategy to enable it to compete
with its main competitor, Countrywide Mortgage, one of the first major
lenders to fail in the string of mortgage company failures to follow. 312
WaMu’s strategy included liberal underwriting standards and inadequate
risk controls. 313 That high-risk strategy combined with the housing and
mortgage market collapse in mid-2007 left WaMu with loan losses,
borrowing capacity limitations, and a falling stock price. 314 To compound
the problems, in Fall 2008, depositors made a run on the bank and
withdrew significant funds after WaMu’s problems were made public. 315
Thereafter, WaMu was unable to raise capital to cover depositor
withdrawals, forcing the OTS to close the institution on September 25,

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

WEISMANN, PETERSON, AND BUSCAGLIA_FINAL (ARTICLE 2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

THE NEW MACROPRUDENTIAL REFORM PARADIGM

8/28/2014 2:31 PM

1073

2008. 316
The IG concluded that the FDIC properly conducted its required
monitoring of WaMu from 2003 to 2008. 317 As a result of this monitoring,
the FDIC identified risks with WaMu’s lending strategy and internal
controls. 318 However, the risks noted in the FDIC’s monitoring reports did
not result in an increase in WaMu’s deposit insurance premium
payments. 319 This discrepancy occurred because the deposit insurance
regulations rely on the safety and soundness ratings and regulatory capital
levels determined by the primary regulator to gauge risk and assess related
deposit insurance premiums, in this case the OTS. 320 Since the OTS
examination results were satisfactory, based upon OTS’ misguided reliance
on WaMu’s own tracking system, increases in deposit insurance premiums
were not triggered. 321
3. Evaluating the regulator
The IG concluded that the interagency agreement did not provide the
FDIC with the access to information that it needed to assess WaMu’s risk
to the DIF. 322 Additionally, it found that the interagency agreement then in
effect did not allow the FDIC sufficient flexibility to obtain information
necessary to assess risk in order to protect the DIF. 323 Finally, the IG also
concluded that FDIC deposit insurance regulations are too restrictive in
prescribing the information used to assign an institution’s insurance
category and premium rate. 324 In short, the regulatory paradigm designed
by Congress failed to achieve the intended goal of credible regulatory
oversight.
4. Reform Act remediation
As a consequence of the WaMu failure, the OTS was dissolved and
merged into the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the duties
were then split between the OCC and the FDIC. 325 Additionally, the

316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. OTS Integration, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
http://www.occ.gov/about/who-we-are/occ-for-you/bankers/ots-integration.html.
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Reform Act now includes the Dissolution Authority for Large,
Interconnected Companies Act of 2009. 326 Under this Act, the FDIC is
authorized to make a written recommendation regarding systemic risk to
U.S. economic stability posed by a financial institution in default or in
danger of default. 327 Remarkably, at that point, the FDIC may be appointed
as a receiver of a financial institution for a one-year period to take “certain
discretionary actions to stabilize or dissolve the institution.” 328
CONCLUSION: CAN MACROPRUDENTIAL REFORMS WORK?
Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke argues that “a macroprudential
approach would complement and build on the current regulatory and
supervisory structure, in which the primary focus is the safety and
soundness of individual institutions and markets.” 329 However, there are
two problems that must be overcome before accepting this argument as a
proven assumption.
First, the existing regulatory and supervisory infrastructure failed to
demonstrate the ability to forecast, much less even recognize, the severity
of systemic risk until it had seized the markets. By the time regulators, risk
managers, and central bankers understood that systemic risk had penetrated
the markets, it had already spread into full-scale global systemic distress.
In short, there was a failure of credible regulatory oversight.
Concomitantly, externalities including the legal limits on regulatory
powers, political interests, private sector self-regulation, regulatory gaps
and inefficiency in information sharing among competitive federal agencies
all combined to inject greater complexity into the regulatory system. The
failure of regulatory and supervisory oversight results in part from these
weaknesses illustrated by the analysis of the five federal agencies.
Second, the regulatory and supervisory infrastructure was incapable of
reining in the market participants or proposing remedial measures to
temper the disaster. Instead, the government sponsored bail-out, described
as “the most profound system shift over the course of recovery,” resulted in
the massive transfer of risk from the private institutions to governments and
central banks. 330 Specifically, the bail-out engineered the direct acquisition

326. Reform Act, supra note 12.
327. Id.
328. Weismann, supra note 29, at 37.
329. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Res. Bank, Remarks at the Council on Foreign
Relations, “Financial Reform to Address Systemic Risk” (March 10, 2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090310a.htm.
330. STATE STREET CORP., VISION FOCUS: SYSTEMIC RISK: STRATEGIC CHALLENGES FOR
POLICY
MAKERS
AND
PRACTIONERS,
(2011),
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of impaired securities, the use of deficit spending to generate economic
stimulus and the issuance of new liquidity through quantitative easing. 331
In short, the regulatory models designed to ensure that financial institutions
would remain liquid and insulated from market failure in the event of crisis,
were useless. The massive bank failures described above well illustrate
this point. In fact, the bail-out strategy fueled by direct government
intervention wholly circumvented the regulatory process and the
consequences of natural market forces. The bail-out arguably incentivizes
excessive risk taking where market participants escape failure and/or
regulatory enforcement. The macroprudential approach, designed to
embrace both the financial and securities markets, is an untested strategy
designed to address these problems. Congress, now in lockstep with the
regulators, has agreed in principle that some form of broader regulation is
needed to close regulatory gaps and address other externalities that impact
oversight in the market. However, the idea that broader regulation is
necessary does not necessarily mean more rules. There will be some new
rules to penetrate the dark markets – those heretofore unregulated products
creating black box regulatory gaps in the marketplace. Yet, certain
significant aspects of the regulatory infrastructure remain unchanged. This
point is critical to understanding the question of ultimate success of
macroprudential regulation under the new Reform Act.
Specifically, the model of market self-regulation, embedded in the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, will not
change. The idea that natural market forces should control the operation of
the markets and that regulation is an artificial constraint which results in
market distortion is the governing philosophy of managerial capitalism.
The regulators are expected to remain relatively detached from the day to
day affairs of the marketplace, described by former SEC Chairman and
U.S. Supreme Court Justice William Douglas as the “shot gun behind the
door” approach: regulators should be ready to intervene when the private
sector misbehaves. 332 This model is aptly characterized as reactive
regulation to crisis.
Likewise, functional regulation will also remain in place. Regulators
of each agency will continue to protect their own respective turfs and share
very little of the actual regulatory redrafting, leaving out the FSOC

http://www.statestreet.com/wps/wcm/connect/a862f6804a2d7e3697de9fed29523c35/1100022684_VF_SystemicRisk.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CONVERT_TO=url&CACHEID=a862f68
04a2d7e3697de9fed29523c35.
331. Id. at 15.
332. See Douglas, supra note 139 at 82 (summarizing the addresses and statements of
SEC Chairman Douglas).
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altogether in the actual rule making process. The FSOC will remain a
“looker” rather than a “doer.” Functional regulation will continue the
practice of overlapping agency authority based upon the particular financial
activity as opposed to the industry being regulated.
What has changed is the recognition that the FSOC must exist to force
the regulators to sit at the same table and share perceptions about market
activity so that the possibility of an entire regulatory infrastructure being
blindsided by the private sector is diminished. Thus, faith in the system of
market self-regulation grounded on a functional regulatory infrastructure
that is highly reactive to market events is a necessary condition precedent
to concluding that the new system of macroprudential regulation can work.
The Hanson, Kashyap & Stein study raised the question of whether
the existing weaknesses in the regulatory system itself can be addressed
“sensibly.” 333 That question cannot be answered simply given the
complexity of the regulatory system upon which reform rests. While Nier
recommends a new and sound taxonomy for the implementation of
macroprudential policy, 334 the theory is somewhat disconnected from the
actual regulatory infrastructure in place. Arguably, the current regulatory
infrastructure does not mesh fully with the proposed taxonomy based on
intentional legislative design and market realities. A reassessment of the
role of regulatory agencies in the private sector may be required before any
long-term strategic plan can be expected to meet reform expectations. In
any case, in a world of private interests and Wall Street domination, it
would be a long and bitter fight.

333. See Hanson et al., supra, note 22.
334. See Nier, supra, note 46.

